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This study analyzed the questions of whether capital structure adjustment in 
European firms differed by listing type and by current debt ratio. Major issues are 
concerned with (1) the adjustment speed toward target debt ratio and (2) the 
length of the adjustment period required toward the ratios. Results showed that (1) 
the speed of adjustment of firms with lower debt ratios were faster; (2) the 
adjustment speeds of listed firms were faster than those of delisted and unlisted 
firms; and (3) the length of the half-life adjustment time toward target ratio was 
shorter for listed firms than for delisted and unlisted firms. This paper contributed 
to the development of capital structure issues in that the adjustment speed could be 
different depending on firms’ current debt ratios and listing types, unlike previous 
results in the literature. 
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1. Introduction 
If finance scholars are asked about the one most important topic in capital 
structure, it is very unlikely that they would exclude Modigliani and Miller’s 1958 
seminal theory. The theory states that under the assumption of a perfect capital 
market, the capital structure is irrelevant to the corporate market values. However, 
their debt irrelevance theorem is known to be valid on the unrealistic assumption 
of perfect capital market and will not hold in realities where market imperfections 
exist. This consensus has led to development of many theories on capital structure. 
One theory, called the partial adjustment model, recently stands out for its 
importance. This theory, which claims both the existence of target debt ratio and 
the subsequent lagged adjustment toward the target, has in fact attracted 
attention from finance academics for more than thirty years. This theory in which 
firms target debt ratios has been supported by two types of claims, according to 
Chang and Dasgupta (2009). One is the notion of weighted average cost of capital, 
which presupposes the existence of target capital structure. The other claim is from 
the tradeoff model that implies the existence of an optimal debt ratio. When 
reviewing past research about partial adjustment theory toward target debt ratio, I 
find that the studies by Taggart (1977) and Jalilvand and Harris (1984) constitute 
the earliest related research on this model. The economic importance of the theory 
can be confirmed by the voluminous recent research, including Flannery and 
Rangan (2006), Serrasquerio and Nunes (2008), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 
(2008), Byoun (2008), and Huang and Ritter (2009). Among others, Huang and 
Ritter (2009) emphasize the importance of this theory by stating that “This is the 
most important issue in capital structure research today.”  
Two research aspects are worth mentioning from these previous studies: One 
aspect is the difference in estimation results on the adjustment speeds toward 
targets, and the other aspect is about the use of appropriate econometric 
methodology. First, in the previous research, one single speed of adjustment 
toward targets has been reported for its own sample firms, but the problem is that 
different research on different samples in different countries reports different 
speeds of adjustment (Driffield and Pal, 2008). For example, in studies on US firms, 
Fama and French (2002) reported 7%-18%, Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), 
25%, and Flannery and Rangan (2006), 33.5%-34.2%. In contrast, in studies on 
European firms, 57% was reported for UK firms (Ozkan, 2001), 53% for German 
firms (Friderichs, Gerdesmeier, Kremp, Paranque, Sauve, Scheuer, and Stoss, 1999), 
28% for French firms (Friderichs et al., 1999), 79% for Spanish firms (Miguel and 
Pindado, 2001), 14%-38.7% for Swiss firms (Gaud, Jani, Hoesli, and Bender, 2005), 
33%-34% for Portuguese firms (Serrasquerio and Nunes, 2008), 41.9%-44.4% for 
Bulgarian firms (Nivorozhkin, 2003), 11.8%-18% for Czech firms (Nivorozhkin, 
2003), and 52.1%-57.3% for Norwegian firms (Aksel, 2008). In contrast, Driffield 
and Pal (2008) reported much higher speeds of adjustment in their study on Asian 
countries: 80.96% for Korea, 90.45% for Indonesia, 86.78% for Malaysia, 88.16% for 
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Thailand, 86.48% for Hong Kong, and 80.53% for Singapore. These results of 
different adjustment speeds can be partly supported by the remark of Frank and 
Goyal (2007): “The speed at which it happens is not a settled issue.” Second, the 
most popular methodology of the previous research has been the fixed-effect 
panel estimation method, mainly because the data used has been constructed in 
the panel form. For example, such studies as Flannery and Rangan (2006), 
Serrasquerio and Nunes (2008), Hovakimian and Li (2008), Antoniou, Guney, and 
Pauydal (2008) and Huang and Ritter (2009) have used this method. In addition, the 
dynamic partial adjustment model which incorporates time difference into the 
model has been used in the studies by Drobetz, Pensa, and Wanzenried (2006) and 
Cook and Tang (2009). Another type of the methodology found in the literature is 
the ordinary least squares method, which ignores fixed-effect in the data (Fama 
and French, 2002). 
In this paper, the topic of the partial adjustment model will be analyzed with the 
data of the European firms from different perspectives. First, the possible non-
linear relations between debt ratio and its determinants will be incorporated in the 
analysis by using quantile regressions. One representative study in which the 
quantile regression was used for capital structure issue is the study by Fattouh, 
Scaramozzino, and Harris (2008) on UK firms. Second, unlike previous studies, the 
differences in adjustment speeds among firms will be assumed to exist in the 
analysis. Most previous studies have assumed one single adjustment speed, with 
the exception of Jalivand and Harris (1984) and Driffield and Pal (2008). Quantile 
regression is believed to be one possible solution for this issue of different 
adjustment speeds because changes in the entire distribution can be analyzed. 
Third, the effect of listing types on adjustment speed will be also covered in the 
present analysis. It is partly because firms of different listing types have different 
access to capital markets, and partly because not much previous research on 
capital structure has included delisted or unlisted firms in its analysis (Farooqi-Lind, 
2006; Bartholdy and Mateus, 2011). My concern here is “Will it be necessary to 
build a new theory on adjustment speed for unlisted and delisted firms?” 
The following results were obtained from this analysis. First, the adjustment speeds 
were found to be different depending on firms’ debt ratios. The adjustment speeds 
of firms with lower debt ratios turned out to be faster than those of firms with 
higher debt ratios. Accordingly, firms with higher debt ratios turned out to have the 
shortest half-life adjustment time. Second, the adjustment speed of listed firms 
was estimated to be faster than that of delisted or unlisted firms. Accordingly, the 
length of the half-life adjustment was the shortest for listed firms, then for delisted 
firms, and finally for unlisted firms.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, methodology will be 
explained, together with possible effects of listing types from the finance 
perspective. Data and empirical results will be explained in Section 3, and the paper 
will conclude in Section 4. 
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2. Model 
2.1. Speed of Adjustment Model 
In this study, two-stage estimation method was used in order to measure the speed 
of adjustment. This way of estimating the partial adjustment model through two 
stages was also adopted in the previous studies, including Serrasquerio and Nunes 
(2008), Hovakimian and Li (2008), Huang and Ritter (2009), Cook and Tang (2009), 
and Bartholdy and Mateus (2011). Compared to this research, the difference in this 
paper is that quantile regression was used when carrying out two stage estimation. 
In the first stage, we estimate target debt ratio at time ( 1+t ) by using information 









* β̂       (1) 
where 1,* +tiDR  is the target debt ratio at time ( 1+t ), and tiX ,  is the capital 
structure determinants for firm i  at time t , such as tangibility, non-debt tax-shield, 
profitability, and firm size. Then, as in (2), we measure how much the actual 
adjustment was made against the target debt ratio in the second stage. This means 
that a firm’s financing choice at any point in time is a function of its current debt 
ratio and a “target” debt ratio, and it is assumed in this model that firms make 
financing choices that minimize the cost of deviation from this optimal debt ratio. 
1,,1,
*
,,1, )( +++ +−+=− titititititi DRDRDRDR εδα    (2) 
where ti,δ  is called the speed of adjustment. If we substitute (1) into (2), we obtain 
the following relationship (3). 
1,1,
*
,,,1, )1( +++ ++−+= titititititi DRDRDR εδδα    (3) 
This can be interpreted as follows: (1) when ti,δ  equals 1, it means that the actual 
adjustment is the same as the amount that should be adjusted or 100% perfect 
adjustment is made in just one period; (2) when ti,δ  equals 0, it means that no 
actual adjustment is made compared to the target debt ratio; (3) when the 
absolute value ti,δ  is smaller than 1, the actual debt ratio approaches the target 
ratio as time passes, and (4) when ti,δ  is greater than 1 or less than -1, the actual 
debt ratio will be adjusted in the opposite way to the direction of target ratio. 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) interpret the speed of adjustment in relation with the 
adjustment costs such as legal fees and issue costs of securities. They claim that the 
estimated speed of adjustment one indicates the absence of adjustment costs. In 
contrast, the adjustment speed zero indicates the high adjustment costs, leading to 
no adjustment toward the target ratio at all. 
2.2. Listing Types and Financial Characteristics 
In this study, the terminology “listed firms” refers to firms which maintained listing 
from 1991 through 2007 or firms that were first listed on the stock exchange during 
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the period and maintained listing at the time of 2007. “Delisted firms” refers to 
firms that stopped listing on the stock exchange during the data period because of 
bankruptcies and other reasons. For example, US firms begin delisting procedures 
when they do not meet the continued listing criteria such as share distribution 
criteria, market value criteria, and price criteria. And finally, “unlisted firms” refers 
to firms that are not registered as listed firm on the exchange due to lack of listing 
requirements such as asset size. For example, in the UK, some of the required 
conditions for initial listing include market value of more than ￡700,000, and the 
minimum 25% distribution of stocks held by general public. 
The following characteristics are worth mentioning from a comparison of listed 
firms with unlisted firms. Above all, unlisted firms tend to be smaller in firm size. 
And, the information about these firms is relatively not opaque because of less 
concern from the public press, although the firms provide annual reports. 
Compared to listed firms, different corporate governance systems exist in this type 
of unlisted firms. And it is expected that agency problems are less severe in 
unlisted firms and they are expected to have relatively lower costs of agency 
problems. Debt ratios of these unlisted firms can be similar to those of listed firms, 
but the sources of debt financing tend to be different from listed firms. Unlisted 
firms are more likely to depend more on non-traded debts such as bank loans and 
trade credit for lower costs of capital because they do not have easy access to 
financial market as listed firms do. In contrast, listed firms are more strictly 
monitored by the general public because they have to provide annual reports to 
stock exchanges. Public bond, syndicated bank loans, and commercial papers are 
major debt financing instruments for these firms. Unlisted firms have incentives to 
become listed firms for many reasons (Loderer and Waelchli, 2010). The benefits 
include (1) trading of stocks through more liquid stock market, (2) higher 
diversification ability on the part of stockholders, (3) gains from market timing, (4) 
lower costs of capital, (5) tapping of new financing sources, (6) enhanced 
reputation effect, and (7) increased flexibility in designing performance-based 
compensation. In contrast, when going listing, the marginal costs incur such as (1) 
giving up of private control effect and (2) costs involved in the listing process. 
3. Data and Empirical Results 
3.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This study depended on the OSIRIS of Bureau van Dijk from WRDS (Wharton 
Research Data Services) for its database. The sample countries selected for this 
analysis included 25 countries in Europe: Austria (OSIRIS country code: AT), Belgium 
(BE), Switzerland (CH), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Denmark (DE), Estonia 
(EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), United Kingdom (GB), Greece (GR), 
Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), 
the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SE), 
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Slovenia (SI), and the Slovak Republic (SK). The data period covered 17 years from 
1991 through 2007, and the total number of firm-year data points reached 80,720. 
Table 1: Structure of Panel Data: Number of Firm-Year Observations by 
Country, Year, and Listing Type 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Numbers in each cell are number of firms for analysis for listed, (delisted), and [unlisted] firms.  
In the previous literature, such as Frank and Goyal (2007), many factors are known 
to affect firms’ debt ratios: profitability, firm size, growth, industry classification, 
nature of assets, taxes, risk, supply-side factors, stock market conditions, debt 
Patterns of Capital Structure Adjustment by Listing Type: Evidence from European Firms 
 
 
EJBE 2012, 5 (9)                                                                                      Page | 109 
market conditions, and macroeconomic conditions. In this analysis, I used four 
independent variables, tangibility, NDTS (non-debt tax shield), profitability, and 
firm size, together with the dependent variable, long-term debt ratio, by following 
Fattouh, Scaramozzino, and Harris (2005, 2008). Asset tangibility was computed as 
(fixed asset/total asset)*100, NDTS, (depreciation and amortization expenses/total 
asset)*100, profitability, (earning after tax/total asset)*100, and firm size, log 
(sales). Table 1 provides frequency distributions for the entire data by country, by 
listing types, and by year. Let us first take the 1995 data of the Netherlands for 
explanation. In 1995, the respective numbers of listed, delisted, and unlisted firms 
in the Netherlands were 80, 69, and 21. And the total numbers of listed, delisted, 
and unlisted firms in Denmark for analysis reached 1,364, 683, and 125, 
respectively. Table 2 reports median values as representative statistic for 
independent variables by listing type and by year. For example, the medians for the 
debt ratio variable ltd_ratio are 12.71%, 12.78%, and 18.72% for listed, delisted, 
and unlisted firms, respectively, in 2003. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (%) 








































































































































































































































































Ltd_ratio, NDTS, ROA, and firm size respectively stand for long-term debt ratio, non-debt tax shield, 
return on asset, and size of a firm. The figures in each cell represent median values (%) for listed, 
(delisted), and [unlisted] firms. 
Table 3: Correlation Coefficients 
 Ltd_ratio Tangibility ROA Firm size NDTS 
Ltd_ratio 1.000000     
Tangibility  0.284503 1.000000    
ROA -0.136713 0.026080 1.000000   
Firm size 0.009110 0.069696 0.231027 1.000000  
NDTS 0.053470 0.056326 -0.276968 0.035036 1.000000 
Note: Ltd_ratio, NDTS, ROA, and firm size respectively stand for long-term debt ratio, non-debt tax 
shield, return on asset, and size of a firm. 
Table 3 reports correlation coefficients among variables employed in this study. We 
find in this table that the correlations among the variables are not so high. The 
correlation coefficients between debt ratio (ltd_ratio) and profitability (ROA), and 
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NDTS and ROA turned out to be negative whereas those between other variables 
turned out to be positive. 
3.2 Empirical Results 
3.2.1. Estimation of the Base Quantile Regression Model 
We estimated (1) for the entire data set first and then each respective data set by 
listing types. Regression results for the entire data set are presented in Table 4. We 
find in Table 4 significant coefficient estimates at almost all quantiles, except for 
the coefficients of NDTS and ROA at 20% and 10% quantiles, respectively. 
The estimated coefficients of (1) for each respective data set are plotted in Figure 1 
by firms’ listing types. Overall results showed that the coefficient signs turned out 
to be consistent with the claims of theories at almost all quantiles. At the same 
time, the results showed the usefulness of quantile regression because different 
coefficients were found for different quantiles and by listing types.  
Table 4: Quantile Regression Estimates  




















































































































Note: Ltd_ratio, NDTS, ROA, and firm size respectively stand for long-term debt ratio, non-debt tax 
shield, return on asset, and size of a firm. Figures in parentheses indicate t-statistics.  
First, as the variable tangibility increases, the debt ratio also increases because of 
the role of tangible assets as collateral. When we look at the coefficient estimates 
at higher levels than that at the 50% quantile by listing types, we find lower 
coefficient estimates of delisted firms than those of listed and unlisted firms. This 
means that although the unit increase in asset tangibility can invite more use of 
debt because of increasing capacity as collateral at relatively high levels of debt 
ratios, the increasing degree of debt capacity is lower than those of the listed and 
unlisted firms. 
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This also implies that investors are less likely to provide more debts to delisted 
firms because of their higher default risk. Second, the profitability coefficients were 
estimated to be negative at all quantiles as the theory predicts that the more 
profitable a firm becomes, the less likely it will use debts. We find that as debt ratio 
increases, the absolute value of negative coefficient for ROA becomes greater, 
irrespective of their listing types. This means that at higher debt levels, firms will 
depend less on debts or redeem debts. Third, the coefficients of the variable firm 
size were estimated to be positive at low and middle debt levels, whereas at high 
levels such as the 90% quantile, the coefficient was estimated to be negative for all 
listing types of firms. Negative signs were found for unlisted, listed, and delisted 
firms at quantiles after 50%, 80%, and 90% quantiles, respectively. This implies that 
despite the increase in firm size, unlisted firms with debt ratios higher than that at 
50% quantile do not increase debt ratios; rather, they reduce them. This also 
implies that compared to increased debt capacity due to the increase in firm size, 
the effect from default risk may become greater from this debt level.The marginal 
debt level for coefficients to become negative turned out to be higher for listed and 
delisted firms than for unlisted firms: 80%, 90%, and 50% quantiles, respectively. 
The debt level from which default risk exceeds debt capacity is the highest for 
delisted firms. This is interpreted as follows. It becomes very difficult for delisted 
firms to borrow debt at very high debt levels despite their debt capacity stemming 
from firm size. Up to 80% and 90 % debt quantiles, we could confirm the firm size 
effect. In other words, the firm size effect existed up to the 50% quantile for 
unlisted firms. This may be partly attributed to their reputation effect. Unlisted 
firms, other things being equal, do not have easier access to financial markets and 
have less debt capacity than do listed firms. Fourth, we find lower coefficient 
estimates of NDTS at higher quantiles of debt ratios. This result is consistent with 
the claim that the incentive to use NDTS will be reduced at higher debt levels 
because of the overlapping effect from the tax shield of debt. The coefficient 
estimates of listed firms turned out to be the highest at all quantiles, followed by 
delisted firms, and then unlisted firms. This result was interpreted in the following 
way. The negative coefficient estimates could be observed because firms have 
incentives to reduce debt levels in the presence of NDTS. And, those effects to 
reduce debts turned out to be the greatest for unlisted firms, next for delisted 
firms, and finally for listed firms.  
3.2.2. Estimation of the Speed of Adjustment  
The speeds of adjustment were estimated by using (3), and the results are reported 
in Table 5. We find in the table that the estimated speeds of adjustment at 30% 
quantile are 0.2338, 0.2047, and 0.1456 for listed, delisted, and unlisted firms, 
respectively. The speeds of adjustment for all listing types and quantiles were 
estimated to be positive between zero and one except for just one case. This 
means that debt adjustment has been made partially every period for all types of 
firms. For example, the speed of adjustment for all firms was estimated to be 
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0.0743 at the 70% quantile, suggesting that 7.43% of the difference between 
current debt ratio and target ratio has been adjusted every year.  
Table 5: Regression Estimates of Adjustment Speed by Quantiles 
                                All                                       Listed                                      Delisted                                Unlisted 
  Coefficient   S.E. Coefficient   S.E. Coefficient  S.E. Coefficient  S.E. 
Q10 0.5536 0.0107 0.5825 0.0122 0.5368 0.0134 0.4193 0.0388 
Q20 0.3234 0.0057 0.3472 0.0079 0.3058 0.0091 0.2332 0.0149 
Q30 0.2173 0.0037 0.2338 0.0048 0.2047 0.0065 0.1456 0.0119 
Q40 0.1505 0.0036 0.1643 0.0044 0.1411 0.0062 0.0903 0.0078 
Q50 0.1061 0.0038 0.1181 0.0051 0.1010 0.0047 0.0473 0.0081 
Q60 0.0798 0.0039 0.0945 0.0060 0.0776 0.0068 0.0201 0.0050 
Q70 0.0743 0.0039 0.0866 0.0067 0.0758 0.0079 0.0151 0.0062 
Q80 0.0836 0.0059 0.0970 0.0081 0.0864 0.0094 0.0058 0.0137 
Q90 0.1103 0.0104 0.1334 0.0102 0.1128 0.0158 a -0.0144 0.0294 
S.E. stands for standard errors for the coefficient. These results are based on the regression (3). 
Notation a indicates a special case, where the regression estimate turned out to be negative.  
The results in Table 5 are illustrated in Figure 2a and Figure 2b. We see in Figure 2a 
that the speed of adjustment depended on the current levels of debt ratios for all 
firms. When the debt ratios were in the lower (higher) quantiles, the adjustment 
speeds were estimated to be higher (lower). For example, the speed of adjustment 
was estimated to be 0.5536 at the 10% quantile, and it decreased to the minimum 
level of 0.0743 at the 70% quantile. The estimates of speeds were slightly higher at 
the higher levels of quantiles such as 80% and 90%. The general pattern is that the 
speed of adjustment was higher at lower quantile levels, and it tended to decrease 
as the current debt level increased.  
The graphs in Figure 2b illustrate the reported results in Table 5. I find the following 
characteristics. First, the speeds of adjustment were estimated to be fastest for 
listed firms, followed by delisted firms, and then for unlisted firms at all quantiles 
of debt ratios. The reason is probably because listed firms are more likely to have 
enjoyed relatively easier access to financial markets and institutions, which makes 
it possible to have issued securities in the financial market and to borrow loans 
from banks. And, compared to delisted and unlisted firms, listed firms might have 
more cash holdings and be more profitable, which also makes it possible to redeem 
debts. This will lead to faster speed of adjustment on the part of listed firms. In 
contrast, unlisted firms do not have easier access to financial markets, which will 
result in the slowest speed of adjustment. Second, the speeds of adjustment at 
relatively lower quantile levels were higher than those at higher quantile levels. Let 
us take one example from Table 5. The speed of adjustment for listed firms at the 
10% quantile was estimated as 0.5825. It decreased to be the minimum level of 
0.0866 at the 70% quantile, and slightly increased to 0.0970 at the 80% quantile. 
This phenomenon can be interpreted in the way that if firms with lower debt ratios 
increase debt by the same amount as firms with higher debt ratios, the relative 
change in the speed of adjustment will be greater for the firms with lower debt 
ratios. Similar patterns can be observed for delisted and unlisted firms. Third, one 
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particular case is the result for the negative speed of adjustment -0.0144 for 
unlisted firms at the 90% quantile. This can be interpreted in such a way that firms 
at very high levels of debt ratio might have adjusted the debt ratios in the opposite 
direction. When the current debt ratio is very high, firms are very likely to set the 
lower ratio as a target at the next period. That is, the term )( ,1,
*
titi DRDR −+  will be 
negative. In actuality, however, the firms might have increased their debt ratios to 
the contrary of their expectation. That is, )( ,1, titi DRDR −+  can be positive. Thus, the 
negative coefficient of ti,δ  is possible. 









0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
delta
 
Figure 2a: Speed of Adjustment, (a) Speed of Adjustment by Quantiles for 
All Firms 














Figure 2b: (b) Speed of Adjustment by Quantiles for Three Listing Types of 
Firms 
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3.2.3. Time Required for Half-life Adjustment  
The questions of how long it takes firms to reach their target debt ratios are 
analyzed and their results are reported in Table 6. The time periods of half-life 
adjustment required to the target ratio were computed, assuming the difference to 
the target ratio to be 100 %. Let us take one example for explanation. The speed of 
adjustment and the expected time to the target ratio for listed firms were, 
respectively, 0.0866 and 7.6522 years at the 70% quantile. This number of 
expected time for half-life adjustment was obtained from )0866.01log(/5.0log − , 
according to suggestion by Elsas and Florysiak (2010). This means that the annual 
adjustment will be 8.66% on average, which will result in 7.6522 years in reaching 
the target debt ratio. Similarly, the speed of adjustment for all pooled firms at the 
20% quantile was 0.3234, which will result in 1.7742 years for half-life adjustment 
to the target. All numbers given in the table are computed this way. One 
exceptional case is the long time periods of more than 10 years for half-life 
adjustment. At the 50%, 60%, 70%, and 80% quantiles, the expected half-life 
adjustment periods were estimated to be, respectively, around 14, 34, 46, and 119 
years for unlisted firms. At an extreme case of the 90% quantile for unlisted firms, 
the estimated time for half-life adjustment turned out to be negative. It was 
around -48 years. This means those firms’ efforts to reduce debt ratios were not 
successful, which brought about the opposite result. Thus, it seems to be 
impossible for these firms at this 90% quantile to reach the target debt ratio during 
their lifetimes. 
Table 6: Expected Time for Half-life Adjustment by Quantile (in Years) 
   Quantile              All                       Listed                  Delisted                Unlisted 
Q10 0.8594 0.7936 0.9007 1.2753 
Q20 1.7742 1.6253 1.8991 2.6104 
Q30 2.8291 2.6028 3.0264 4.4049 
Q40 4.2496 3.8619 4.5571 7.3240 
Q50 6.1799 5.5153 6.5101 14.305 
Q60 8.3347 6.9826 8.5811 34.137 
Q70 8.9780 7.6522 8.7933 45.556 
Q80 7.9396 6.7934 7.6707 119.16 
Q90 5.9309 4.8412 5.7914 b -48.481 
The expected times of half-life adjustment to the target ratio for firms were based on the speed of 
adjustment in Table 3. The speed of adjustment for delisted firms at 30% quantile was 0.2047, and the 
expected time for half-life adjustment was computed as )2047.01log(/5.0log − . Notation b indicates a 
special case, where the expected period of half-life adjustment turned out to be negative. The 
adjustment time was calculated from )0144.01log(/5.0log + . This means that at this current adjustment 
rate, it is impossible for these firms to adjust to the target ratio. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The major findings from this analysis are as follows. First, the speeds of adjustment 
of firms with lower debt ratios turned out to be higher than those of firms with 
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higher debt ratios. Second, the adjustment speed depended on listing types. That 
is, the speed of listed firms was the fastest, followed by delisted firms, and then 
unlisted firms. Consequently, the expected time of half-life adjustment to the 
target debt ratios was shortest for listed firms, next for delisted firms, and finally 
for unlisted firms. Firms’ accessibility to financial markets might be the reason for 
this difference. 
The noteworthy contributions of this paper are two-fold. One is that this study 
analyzed the firms’ behavior toward target debt ratio by listing types, such as listed 
vs. delisted vs. unlisted firms. Considering the relative scarcity of research on 
delisted and unlisted firms compared to that on listed firms, this study contributed 
to the existing literature by including such firms. The other contribution is that 
unlike previous studies, the speed of adjustment can be different depending on 
firms’ debt ratios and listing types, which resulted in different periods of half-life 
adjustment to target ratios.  
One of the limitations in this study is that additional variables such as the cost of 
borrowing should have been included. Such a cost could be significantly different 
for firms in different countries and be significantly different for the same firm in 
different time periods because of market conditions. 
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